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Abstract. A program verifier is a tool that can be used to verify that
a “contract” for a program holds – i.e. given a precondition the program
guarantees that a given postcondition holds – by only working at the
level of the annotated program. An alternative approach is to use an
interactive theorem prover, which enables users to encode common proof
patterns as special programs called “tactics”. This offers more flexibility
than program verifiers, but at the expense of skills required by the user.
Here, we add such flexibility to program verifiers by developing “tactics”
as a form of program refactoring called DTacs. A formal characterisation
and set of examples are given, illustrated with a case study from NASA.
1 Introduction
Properties that programs should satisfy are commonly expressed by contracts –
given a precondition the program guarantees that a given postcondition holds.
Program verifiers can then be used to verify that a contract is satisfied by auto-
matically generating verification conditions (VCs), which are sent to an under-
lying theorem prover. Failures to prove VCs will then be highlighted in the text,
and the user must then update the code with auxiliary annotations to guide the
proof. Program verifiers which follow this approach include Spec# [5], VCC [7],
Verifast [13], Dafny [14], and the 2014 version of SPARK [3].
An alternative is to translate the annotated programs to an interactive theo-
rem prover (ITP) and generate and prove the VCs within this system. However,
the disadvantage with this approach is that the user requires expertise in the
ITP system as well as the ability to specify and implement the desired program.
Many argue that it takes at least six months to become a confident user of an
ITP system (see [16]). Such ITP expertise is not required for program verifiers.
An ITP system keeps a stack of open goals, starting with the singleton stack
containing the VC. Here, the user can interactively guide the proofs, often in
a backwards manner where a ‘proof step’ involves applying a type of program
called a tactic to the top of the stack, and pushing any newly generated sub-goals
to the stack afterwards [11]. Finding a proof is often a trial-and-error process,
which iterates until the stack is empty. A key feature of ITP systems is that
common reasoning patterns can be encoded as new tactics, which in most cases
are combinations of existing ones. This enables automation of common tasks.
A ‘proof step’ in a program verifier involves changing, and in most cases
adding, auxiliary annotations. This author is not aware of any program verifier
with the support for encoding reasoning patterns – and as a result the user will
need to manually encode every ‘proof step’. As some trial-and-error (i.e. search)
may be required, such encoding can be a very tedious and cost-ineffective process.
To enable a user to focus time and effort on key decisions, we hypothesise that:
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It is possible to develop “tactics” to automate program verifiers as tactics
have been used to automate interactive theorem provers.
In order to integrate manual proof steps with such “tactic” applications, the user
will need work on the annotated program, meaning that a “tactic” application
will become a program transformation. For example, a typical step is to add an
intermediate assertion in the code to guide the prover, which means the “tactic”
is a transformation which adds that assertion to the code. Other advantages of
working at the source code level are that users are not required to have additional
expertise, and can inspect the changes a “tactic” has made.
Most modern ITP systems are based on what is known as the LCF approach
[11]. Here, the underlying type system ensures that the only trusted part is a
small ‘kernel’ of axioms/rules (together with the type system itself). Thus, if this
is sound, then it is guaranteed that (a) the proof is sound; and (b) the original
conjecture to be proven is not changed by a tactic. In the “tactics” proposed
here a program is transformed to a new program, and the program verifier is
re-applied. Thus, (a) is reduced to the correctness of the program verifier, and we
are left to focus on (b). Here, one has to ensure that neither the original contract
nor the program is changed – only auxiliary annotations can be altered. This
can be seen as a special case of a behaviour preserving transformation known as
program refactoring [10], so we further hypothesise that:
It is possible to encode program verifier “tactics” as a form of program
refactoring, to ensure that the contract and program are not changed.
To address these hypotheses we will focus on the Dafny system [14], described
next with an analysis of the proof process. Dafny “tactics”, called DTacs, are
defined, formalised and exemplified in §3, and applied to a case study from NASA
in §4. Finally, we conclude and discuss related and future work in §5.
2 Program Verification in Dafny
Dafny [14] is a programming language and program verifier for the .NET plat-
form, developed by Microsoft Research. The language is an imperative object-
oriented language, containing both methods and (proper) functions (without
side-effects). We may used the term ‘methods’ for both methods and functions for
ease of reading. Fig. 1 illustrates a contract for a Dafny method, where requires
precedes a precondition and ensures precedes a postcondition. By declaring this
method as ghost, it becomes a specification element, and will not be compiled. In
fact, a ghost method can be seen as a “lemma”. Variables can also be ghost and
all variables inside a ghost method are automatically treated as ghost variables.
Other annotations include assertions (assert) and loop invariants (invariant).
Note that programming language elements are often used to support the
verification of “lemmas”, thus there is close correspondence here with proofs and
programs. This is exemplified in Fig. 1. As a result, Dafny has been suggested
beyond what is considered to be ‘software verification’ and also as an alternative
to “traditional” theorem provers. One example is found in [15], where Dafny had
comparable results to inductive theorem provers.
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0 ghost method LemmaLength4 ( n : i n t )
1 r e q u i r e s n ≥ 0 ;
2 ensu re s ∃ xs • l e n g t h ( xs ) = n ;{
3 i f ( n = 0){ } e l s e {
4 LemmaLength4 (n−1);
5 var xs : | l e n g t h ( xs ) = n−1; }}
Fig. 1. (Almost) a proof of a “lemma” in Dafny (adapted from [16]).
Fig. 1 represents a “lemma” which states that for a given non-negative num-
ber n, there exists a list of that length. The proof is by induction. For the step
case (n 6= 0) the induction hypothesis is applied by making a recursive call to
itself with n−1 as an argument. This means that we can assume the postcondi-
tion of the recursive call, i.e. ∃ xs . length(xs) =n−1. Using this property, line
5 creates such a list (: | should be read “such that”). No guidance is given for
the base case (n=0) as this is trivial to prove for Dafny.
To verify the program, Dafny translates it into an intermediate verification
language (IVL), called Boogie2 [4]. An IVL can be seen as a layer to ease the
process of generating new program verifiers. From Boogie2 a set of VCs are
generated and sent to the Z3 SMT solver [18]. If it fails, then the failure is
translated back to the Dafny code, via Boogie2. To illustrate, the LemmaLength
method above does not actually verify. The problem is that Dafny is not able to
determine a witness for the existential in the postcondition. Here, the user needs
to give Dafny a hint, achieved by adding the following assertion after line 5:
a s s e r t l e n g t h ( Cons (1 , xs ) ) = n ;
Moreover, since LemmaLength is marked to be a ghost method, it is only there
to aid the verification process. Thus, coming up with this in the first place is
likely to have been part of the proof process in [16]. Such “proof steps” in Dafny,
will form the basis for a “tactic” in this context. Such steps include:
Add assertions. A simple “lemma” can be represented as an assertion in the
text, as illustrated above with assert length(Cons(1,xs)) =n.
Create ghost methods. More involved “lemmas”, such as LemmaLength itself
that require further proofs, can be captured by a ghost method, where the
“lemma” is the postcondition and any required conditions are preconditions.
Add preconditions. In certain cases one can restrict the applicability of meth-
ods with preconditions. To illustrate, when creating LemmaLength, the n ≥0
precondition could have been added in a second step.
Proof by cases. One may need to add code in a ghost method to guide a
proof. One common step is to introduce cases, as shown on lines 3 − 5 of
LemmaLength by using an if−else statement.
Add ghost method calls. One may need to make calls to ghost methods in
order to apply “lemmas”. This was illustrated for LemmaLength by making
a call to itself (to apply the induction hypothesis).
Add ghost variables. This is illustrated on line 5 for the LemmaLength method
(variables declared in ghost methods are implicitly ghost variables).
Add postcondition. One illustration of this is in terms of recursion. A more
general lemma is often easier to prove, thus, by strengthening the postcon-
dition the proof may become simpler.
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We also consider loop invariant generation an important feature. However, we
will not discuss that further here. Our goal is to be able to encode these steps
as “tactics” to automate common proof steps for program verifiers.
3 DTacs – Dafny Tactics
To illustrate how an LCF tactic works with the stack of sub-goals, consider the
stack [A ∧ B,C], and the well-known conjunction introduction (conj-I ) tactic:
`A `B
`A∧B . Applying conj-I will reduce the first sub-goal A ∧ B into the two
sub-goals [A,B], which are popped to the stack: [A,B,C].
In a program verifier such as Dafny, failures to prove verification conditions
are highlighted in the source code, thus an ‘open goal’ should here be seen as:
the type of failure (e.g. a postcondition), properties of the failure (e.g which
postcondition), and the position in the code. The sum of these open goals then
correspond to the stack in an LCF prover. A Dafny “tactic”, which we call DTac,
is a code transformation which creates new (ideally easier to prove) failures when
reapplying the program verifier. To illustrate, consider this MainGoal() method:
method MainGoal ( ) ensures A ∧ B { . . . }
Assume that the postcondition fails to prove. Here, a DTac which corresponds to
the conj-I tactic will, when applied, create one ghost method for each conjunct
and make a call to each of them within the MainGoal() method:
ghost method SubGoalA ( ) ensures A { . . . }
ghost method SubGoalB ( ) ensures B { . . . }
method MainGoal ( ) ensures A ∧ B { SubGoalA ( ) ; SubGoalB ( ) ; }
The program verifier will then solve MainGoal(), but SubGoalA() and SubGoalB()
may fail to verify, creating one or two new sub-goals. Thus, the original goal has
been reduced into simpler goal(s).
While the LCF approach handles soundness by reducing every proof to the
“kernel” of trusted rules [11], we need to restrict the type of transformation al-
lowed, and start with the concept of program refactoring. i.e. “a program trans-
formation which preserves the external behaviour of the original program” [10].
However, the motivation behind our transformations is to prove that a program
satisfies a contract, thus the program should not change at all. Moreover, we
cannot allow arbitrary changes to the annotations and contracts. However, as
the conj-I example showed, a proof is still conducted by changes to the annota-
tions. Thus, we constrain which parts of the code can be changed and which are
“final”, and define a DTac as follows:
Definition 1. A method is either marked as ‘private’ or ‘public’ – or it has been
‘generated’ by a DTac. We separate between the ‘code’ and ‘ specification’ of a
program, where the latter is any elements that are not compiled, i.e. contracts,
annotations and ghost code. A DTac is then a refactoring which
– cannot change the code for ‘private’ and ‘public’ methods;
– cannot strengthen preconditions or weaken postconditions for ‘public’ meth-
ods, but make arbitrary changes to all other specification elements.
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We are interested in proving that the contracts of ‘public’ methods hold – a
‘private’ method is simply there as a helper method, and we can change the
contract as seen fit. The intuition behind allowing this is that if we e.g. strengthen
a precondition, then the caller must prove that it is satisfied when calling it.
Anything ‘generated’ should be seen as part of the proof process and can thus
be changed arbitrarily. Note that a user needs to declare which elements are
‘private’ and which are ‘public’. From definition 1 we can see that:
Theorem 1. A DTac does not change the program and preserves the contract
of ‘public’ methods.
Proof. This follows directly from Definition 1.
The following BNF gives the grammar for DTacs:
〈dtac〉 := 〈name〉‘(’ 〈arg〉∗ ‘)’ ‘:=’ 〈body〉
〈body〉 := when 〈prop〉 then 〈trans〉 | 〈trans〉
〈trans〉 := 〈code〉 =⇒ 〈code〉 [ 〈inst〉 ] | match 〈code〉 [ 〈inst〉 ]
| 〈trans〉 ‘;’ 〈trans〉 | 〈name〉‘(’ 〈arg〉∗ ‘)’ [ 〈inst〉 ]
| or(〈trans〉,〈trans〉)
〈inst〉 := ‘[’(〈pos〉 | ‘?’〈name〉 ‘:=’〈code〉)∗‘]‘
〈pos〉 := ‘@’〈name〉 | line ‘(’〈nat〉∗‘)’ | up‘(’〈pos〉‘)’ | down ‘(’〈pos〉‘)’
‘∗’ represents repetition, ‘[−]’ for optional, and ‘|’ for alternatives. 〈code〉 is the
code and annotation of Dafny, populated with variables (preceded by ‘?’) and a
special rewrite function. This function is overloaded to work for: a single rewrite
rule rewrite(l → r, c); a triple rewrite(l, r, c) or a list rewrite([l1, · · · , ln],
[r1, · · · , rn], c), which is applied pairwise rewrite(li, ri, c). In all cases the code c
is rewritten. We refer to standard rewriting literature for details [2]. For readabil-
ity, we will also use ellipses ‘. . .’ for parts of the code that can be ignored instead
of variables. 〈code1〉 =⇒ 〈code2〉 represents a rewrite rule, and thus 〈code2〉
cannot contain any variables that are not present in 〈code1〉. ‘;’ is sequential
composition, while when and then are used to express conditions. match is
used to check for particular code patterns and instantiate variables, typically
used with a sequentially composed DTacs. or is used to express choice.
We assume the presence of an environment E, which contains binding of
variables and positions which are preceeded by ‘@’. 〈prop〉 is a predicate on the
underlying environment and the source code. In order to have a simpler model
of the composition of DTacs, the variables bindings from the first are removed
before applying the second DTac. This introduces a form of “locality” of the
namespaces: e.g. for dt1; dt2, if both binds say variable ?x then these can be seen
as separate variables. To carry such bindings between DTacs an instantiation
environment 〈inst〉 can be provided. Here, variables can be bound by [?x := e],
where e uses the existing environment. To illustrate in dt1; dt2[?x :=?x], ?x in
dt2 is defined to be the same ?x as in dt1. A second usage of the instantiation
environment is to constrain the position in the source code where a DTac can be
applied – either by giving reference to special comment preceded by ‘@’, or line
numbers. If dt[@p1,@p2], then dt can only be applied at one of these positions.
Inspired by Huet’s Zippers [12], we can also move up and down a statement
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relative to a given position. Note that up/down are only applicable ‘within’
a method – they will fail if attempting to e.g. move down when at the last
statement of the method. Positions are very useful when composing DTacs of
the method. Recursive application of DTacs is prohibited. Fig. 3 contains several
example DTacs. Given source code c and a DTac dtac, ⇓ refactors c into c′:
E ∈ pv(c) 〈E, c, dtac〉 ⇓dt 〈 , c′〉 ` c′
〈c, dtac〉 ⇓ c′
pv(c) can be seen as the verification condition generator, and returns a set of
environments, each containing the bindings: ?error for the type of error; ?err arg
for the property that failed; and @err pos for the position of the error. ⇓dt then
evaluates the DTac and code under this environment. The new source has to be
type correct, and we assume the presence of a typing relation `.
seq
〈E, c, dt1〉 ⇓dt 〈E′′, c′′〉
〈E′′, c′′, dt2〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
〈E, c, dt1; dt2〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
dtac
dtac /∈ {or( , ), ( ; )}
〈E, c, dtac〉 ⇓m E′′ 〈E′′, c, dtac〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c′〉
〈E, c, dtac〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
or1
〈E, c, dt1〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
〈E, c,or(dt1, dt2)〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
or2
〈E, c, dt2〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
〈E, c,or(dt1, dt2)〉 ⇓dt 〈E′, c′〉
match1
〈E, c, c〉 ⇓m E′ 〈E′, c〉 |= p
〈E, c,when p then c〉 ⇓m E′
match2
E′ ∈ pmatch(flush(E) ∪ inst(inst, E), c, c1)
〈E, c, c1 =⇒ c2 inst〉 ⇓m E′
match3
E′ ∈ pmatch(flush(E) ∪ inst(inst, E), c,m)
〈E, c,match m inst〉 ⇓m E′
match4
〈E, c,unfold(dt(args)) inst〉 ⇓m E′
〈E, c, dt(args) inst〉 ⇓m E′
app1
c′ ∈ apply(E, c1 → c2, c)
E′ = E[@pos,@start,@end := @m,@s,@e]
〈E, c, c1 =⇒ c2 inst〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c〉
app2
E′ = E[@pos,@start,@end :=
@m,@s,@e]
〈E, c,match m inst〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c〉
app3
〈E, c,unfold(dt(args)) inst〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c′〉
〈E, c, dt(args) inst〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c′〉
app3
〈E, c, c〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c′〉
〈E, c,when p then c〉〉 ⇓app 〈E′, c′〉
Fig. 2. Evaluation semantics for DTacs.
Fig. 2 defines the ⇓dt relation. First sequences, and or have the obvious
semantics. Other DTacs have two phases: a matching phase followed by an ap-
plication phase.
During the matching phase, if the DTac is conditional (when-then-), the
body is matched then the precondition is checked (by |= whose definition is
omitted). pmatch takes an environment, code and a code pattern, and returns
a set where each element is an environment containing updated with all the
matches. In addition to the variables the bindings from the pattern, ‘?pre’ is
bound to the preconditions, ‘?post’ to the postconditions, ‘?meth’ to the name
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of the method the code is within, and ‘?arg’ to the argument of the method. If
there are e.g. many preconditions, then it is used non-deterministically to refer
to any of them. Moreover, ‘@s’,‘@e’ and‘@m’ become bound to the full, start
and end positions. inst(inst, E) instantiates the variables in inst using E, while
flush removes all binding created by a pattern (e.g. ‘?pre’, ‘@pos’, and ‘?error’
are not removed). unfold unfolds the given DTac and for simplicity we assume
that it has access to all of the definitions.
In the application phase apply(E, r, c) represents the application of a rule r
under the environment E to the code c. Here, ‘@m’ is used to apply it to the
same position as the match from the matching phase. For pmatch and apply
we refer to standard rewriting literature, such as [2], and omit the detail.
From ⇓ we can see that the composition of DTacs preserves the DTac validity;
Theorem 2. If dt1 and dt2 are DTacs then dt1 ; dt2 and or(dt1, dt2) are DTacs.
Proof. or(dt1, dt2) follows directly from ⇓dt and the assumption as either dt1
or dt2 is applied. Following ⇓dt, dt1 ; dt2 first applies dt1, giving c′′, which
by the assumption has only made valid changes following Definition 1. dt2 is
then applied to c′′, which by the assumption has only made changes following
Definition 1. Thus, the dt1 ; dt2 is a DTac following Definition 1.
The first six DTacs of Fig. 3 are adaptations of standard introduction and
elimination tactics. Note that ⇓ ensures that the resulting code is well-typed by
`. post-to-assert turns a postcondition into an assertion at the end of the method
position (achieved by @end), and is normally applied due to a failed postcon-
dition. The assert-to-pre DTac turns an assertion in the beginning of a method
into a precondition, and can be seen as a way of moving the work of proving
?P to the caller. Similarly, assert-to-post moves an assertion to a postcondition
of the method preceding it. Here, rewrite is used to adapt the arguments to
the new context. E.g. if the assertion was x+1 < y with method call ?m(x+1,y)
for method ?m(a,b), then the postcondition would become a < b. assert-rewr
applies a given rewrite rule to an assertion. assert-up moves an assertion up-
wards in the code passing a statement. It is moved into both branches of an
if−else statement, and updated with the expression in case of an assignment
(both achieved by or). A failed postcondition of a method could be due to a
failed postcondition of a nested method call. In this case, the postcondition needs
to be “copied” to the method called, achieved by post-to-post. pre-to-assert and
null-to-assert are examples of DTacs triggered by a particular type of failure, and
in both cases an assertion is added just before the failure. Given a fresh variable
and a predicate, pred-var-I is used to introduce a new ghost variable, such that
the predicate holds. A special use of this is to eliminate an existential quantifier,
as shown in the ex-E DTac. case-I introduces a case split, using an if−else
statement, whilst call-I inserts a call to a ghost method. IH-I is a special case of
call-I, where a recursive call is made to itself, with the argument decremented by
one, at the @case2 position. In addition to those in Fig. 3, five more DTacs are
required for the case study. The definitions of these have been omitted for space
reasons. assert-down moves an assertion down. assert-conj-I splits a conjunction
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assert-I (P) := =⇒ a s s e r t ?P ; /∗@ass∗/
post-I (P) := method ?m( . . ) . . . { . . . } =⇒ method ?m( . . ) . . .ensu re s ?P { . . . }
pre-I (P) := when ?m is not public
then method ?m( . . ) . . . =⇒ method ?m( . . )r e q u i r e s ?P . . .
assert-E() := a s s e r t P ; =⇒ /∗ @ass ∗/
pre-E() := method ?m( . . ) r e q u i r e s ?P . . . =⇒ method ?m( . . ) . . .
post-E() := when ?m is not public
then
method ?m( . . ) . . .
ensu re s ?P { . . . } =⇒
method ?m( . . ) . . .
{ . . . }
post-to-assert() := match
method ?m( . . ) . . .
ensu re s ?P . . . ; assert-I (?P)[@end,?meth := ?m]
assert-to-pre() := assert-E()[@start]; pre-I (?P)[?meth := ?meth]
assert-to-post() := match
?m(? xs ) ;
a s s e r t ?P ; ; assert-E()[@pos,?P := ?P,?m := ?m] ;
match method ?m(? ys ) [?P := ?P,?m := ?m,?xs := ?xs];
post-I (rewrite(?xs, ?ys, ?P ))[?m := ?m]
assert-rewr(R) := assert-E();assert-I (rewrite(R,?P)[@pos]
assert-up1 () := assert-E();assert-I (?P)[up(@pos)]
assert-up2 () := match ?x := ? e ; a s s e r t ?P ; ; assert-E()[@pos,?P:=?P,
?x:=?x,?e:=?e];assert-I (rewrite(?x,?e,?P)[up(@pos)]
assert-up3 () :=
i f ( . . ) { . . } e l s e { . .}
a s s e r t ?P ; =⇒
i f ( . . ) { . . /∗@ass1 /∗ a s s e r t ?P;}
e l s e { . . /∗ @ass1 /∗ a s s e r t ?P;}
assert-up() := or(assert-up3 (),or(assert-up2(),assert-up1 ()))
post-to-post() := match method ?m1(. . .) . . . ensu re s ?P ; { . . . ?m2(? xs ) ; . . . } ;
match method ?m2(? ys ) [?m1:=?m1,?m2 := ?m2, ?xs := ?xs,
?P := ?P] ; post-I (rewrite(?xs, ?ys, ?P ))[?meth := ?m2]
pre-to-assert() := when ?error = “A precondition for this call might not hold”
then assert-I (?err arg)[up(@err pos)]
null-to-assert() := when ?error = “target object may be null”
then assert-I (?err arg 6= null)[up(@err pos)]
pred-var-I (v,P):= =⇒ ghost var v : | P /∗ @gv ∗/
ex-E(x,P) := when P = ∃ ?y.?P ′ then pred-var-I (x,rewrite(?y,x,?P ′))
case-I (cond) := when ?meth is generated
then =⇒ i f ( cond ){ /∗@case1∗/} e l s e {/∗@case2∗/ }
call-I (m,args) := when m is ghost then =⇒ m( a rg s ) ; /∗ @ca l l ∗/
IH-I () := call-I (?meth,?arg - 1)[@case2]
Correctness: assert-I and assert-up3 only adds a specification element. post-I only
strengthens the postcondition, while pre-E only weakens a precondition. pre-I and
post-E have preconditions ruling out application to public methods. assert-E only
removes an assertion pred-var-I only introduces ghost code, while case-I and call-I are
restricted to ghost code. The remaining are just composition or special cases of other
DTacs and are thus correct.
Fig. 3. DTac examples
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in an assertion into one assertion for each conjunct. assert-up-ctxt() behaves as
assert-up, but preserves “context” when within an if (−else) block. E.g. asser-
tion P and condition C, becomes C =⇒P when moving out of the if block and
¬C =⇒P when moving out of the else branch. assert-strengthen() removes a con-
dition (conjunct) from a conditional assertion. Finally, assert-comb1() is a very
low-level DTac which turns assert P =⇒Q; assert P =⇒R into assert Q =⇒R.
{
}
case−I
=⇒
{ i f ( n = 0){/∗@case1∗/}
e l s e {/∗@case2∗/ }
}
IH−I
=⇒
{ i f ( n = 0){/∗@case1∗/}
e l s e {
LemmaLength2 (n−1);
/∗ @ca l l ∗/ }
}
ex−E
=⇒
{ i f ( n = 0){/∗@case1∗/ } e l s e {
LemmaLength2 (n−1);
var xs : | l e n g t h ( xs ) = n−1;
/∗ @gv ∗/ }
}
assert−I
=⇒
{ i f ( n = 0){ } e l s e {
LemmaLength2 (n−1);
var xs : | l e n g t h ( xs ) = n−1;
a s s e r t l e n g t h ( Cons (1 , xs ) ) = n ;
/∗ @ass /∗ }
}
Fig. 4. Proof of the LemmaLength method using DTacs.
Fig. 4 is a proof of the LemmaLength ghost method. The starting point
is the method of Fig. 1, but with an empty body. This fails to prove and
the first step applies case-I ()[?meth := LemmaLength]. IH-I is then used to
apply the “induction hypothesis” where the existential is instantiated by ex-
E (xs,∃ xs . length(xs) =n)[@call]. The proof is completed by giving the witness
for the postcondition as an assertion: assert-I (length(Cons(1,xs)) =n)[@gv]. The
next section contains a larger case study and more realistic applications of DTacs.
4 A SAFER System with DTacs
Fig. 5. Left-to-right: SAFER deployed on an astronaut; the six degrees of movement
axes (top); the hand controller (bottom); the mounting of the thrusters. (source: [19])
Simplified Aid For Eva Rescue (SAFER) is a lightweight backpack propulsion
system developed by NASA, and intended to provide self-rescue capabilities for
astronauts outside the spacecraft in space. It enabes movement along and around
all three axes. At frequent intervals, the software system reads commands from
a hand-controller module (HCM), and various sensors, and selects which of the
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mounted 24 thrusters should be fired (by opening a vent releasing GN2 gas).
In addition to the commands, the system contains an automatic attitude hold
(AAH), which attempts to nullify rotation. The system is shown in Fig. 5.
Several properties of a smaller version of the system have been verified using
PVS [19] and validated by testing using VDM-SL [1]. Here, a subset of this
system is implemented in Dafny, and DTacs are used to ensure freedom of null
references, together with a key functional property: only four thrusters can be
simultaneously fired1. To encode this the following types are used:
datatype cmd = NEG | ZERO | POS;
datatype t h r u s t e r = B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | F1 | . . . ;
datatype sw i t c h = TRAN | ROT;
c l a s s T CMD { var X : cmd ; var Y : cmd ; var Z : cmd ; . . . }
c l a s s R CMD { var r o l l : cmd ; var p i t c h : cmd ; var yaw : cmd ; . . .}
c l a s s R PRED { var r o l l : boo l ; var p i t c h : boo l ; var yaw : boo l ; . . .}
c l a s s SD CMD { var t r a n : T CMD; var r o t : R CMD; . . . }
cmd describes the orientation w.r.t the six axes, thruster is the name of each
thruster, while switch captures the mode of the HCM (see Fig. 5). The class
T CMD holds the “transitional” movements, R CMD “rotational” movement,
and SD CMD combines them. R PRED is a predicate for each rotation axis.
The HCM has a mode switch, and a stick that can be moved in four directions
(along the three axes and twisting). In each step, these values are read from the
HCM and given as input to the control method (note that | s | is the length of
sequence s):
0 method c o n t r o l ( v e r t : cmd , h o r i z : cmd , t r a n s : cmd , t w i s t : cmd , mode : sw i t c h )
1 r e t u r n s ( t h r u s t e r s : seq<t h r u s t e r >) mod i f i e s t h i s ; {
2 ensu re s | t h r u s t e r s | ≤ 4 ;
3 var aah cmd := AAH cmd ( ) ;
4 var gr ip cmd := grip command ( ve r t , ho r i z , t r an s , tw i s t , mode ) ;
5 var cmds := i n t e g r a t e d cmd s ( gr ip cmd , aah cmd ) ;
6 t h r u s t e r s := s e l e c t e d t h r u s t e r s ( cmds ) ; }
This method returns the set of thrusters to fire, and the key property is a poscon-
dition of the method. The additional sensor readings are only required by the
AAH. The four-thruster property is independent of the AAH, and has therefore
been omitted from the program. Thus, we ignore the other sensors. However, we
still need some inputs from the AAH, which are left undefined:
method AAH cmd ( ) r e t u r n s ( r e s : R CMD) ensu re s r e s 6= n u l l ;
method AAH ignore HCM () r e t u r n s ( r e s : R PRED) ensu re s r e s 6= n u l l ;
p r ed i c a t e method AAH a l l a x i s o f f ( )
AAH cmd is the rotation command from the AAH. AAH ignore HCM is used
in certain cases for the AAH to override rotational commands from the HCM.
Finally, AAH all axis off is true if the AAH is off for all axes. Since these are
left unimplemented, the property we prove is true regardless of what is returned
from these methods. These three methods, together with control , are the only
‘public’ methods. The remaining, discussed next, are ‘private’, meaning DTacs
are free to alter their contracts.
1 Various snapshots from verifying these properties in Dafny 1.7.0 can be found at
https://sites.google.com/site/gudmundgrov/research/DafnySAFER.zip.
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On line 4 of control , grip command(vert,horiz , trans , twist ,mode) turns the
inputs into a SD CMD object. If the mode is TRAN then these are mainly tran-
sitional commands, otherwise they are mainly rotational commands. Regardless
of the mode, an X and pitch command will always be issued. On line 5 of control ,
the commands from the HCM and AAH are combined into a single command by
integrated cmds. Here, if all AAH axes are off, then the command becomes the
command from the HCM. Here, rotational commands have priority: if such are
present, then only rotational commands are issued. If not, a transition command
on one axis is issued, with the priority: X > Y > Z. If it is not the case that all
AAH axes are off, and both AAH and HCM rotational commands are present,
then HCM has priority unless AAH ignore HCM specifies that the HCM should
be ignored for that particular axis.
The key logic for the four thruster property is within the selected thrusters
method, applied at the end of control . The encoding here follows directly from
[19]. Firstly, the thrusters are divided into those mounted in a Back or Front
(BF) position, and those in a Left-Right-Up-Down (LRUD) position. Moreover,
“mandatory” and “optional” thrusters are separated, creating four Dafny func-
tions – taking three axis commands and returning a sequence of thrusters. E.g.
f u n c t i o n method BF op t i ona l (A : cmd ,B : cmd ,C : cmd) : seq<t h r u s t e r> {
match A case NEG ⇒ (match B case NEG ⇒ (match C case NEG ⇒ [ B2 , B3 ] . . .
returns the optional BF thrusters. Next, using these functions, methods for the
BF and LRUD as a whole are created, exemplified for BF:
method BF (A : cmd ,B : cmd ,C : cmd) r e t u r n s (man : seq<t h r u s t e r >, opt : seq<t h r u s t e r >){
man := BF mandatory (A,B,C ) ; opt := BF op t i ona l (A,B,C ) ; }
The selected thrusters method then combines these depending on whether or
not X, pitch and yaw commands are present:
method s e l e c t e d t h r u s t e r s ( comb : SD CMD) r e t u r n s ( t h r u s t e r s : seq<t h r u s t e r >){
var bf main , b f o p t := BF(comb . t r an .X, comb . r o t . p i t ch , comb . r o t . yaw ) ;
var l r ud ma in , l r u d o p t := LRUD(comb . t r an .Y, comb . t r an . Z , comb . r o t . r o l l ) ;
i f ( comb . t r an .X = ZERO){
i f ( comb . r o t . p i t c h = ZERO ∧ comb . r o t . yaw = ZERO){
t h r u s t e r s := b f o p t + bf ma in + l r u d o p t + l r ud ma i n ;
} e l s e { t h r u s t e r s := b f o p t + bf ma in + l r ud ma i n ; }
} e l s e {
i f ( comb . r o t . p i t c h = ZERO ∧ comb . r o t . yaw = ZERO){
t h r u s t e r s := b f ma in + l r u d o p t + l r ud ma i n ;
} e l s e { t h r u s t e r s := b f ma in + l r ud ma i n ; }}}
Handling null references Dafny gives 16 errors when trying to verify the
above example, and 15 of them are “target object may be null” thus we need to
rule out the possibility of null references. We will illustrate a common strategy
to prove such goals with one such failure in the selected thrusters method. Here,
the problem is the use of comb in the call to BF. First, the null-to-assert DTac
is applied, resulting in the following update to the code:
a s s e r t comb 6= n u l l ;
var bf main , b f o p t := BF(comb . t r an .X, comb . r o t . p i t ch , comb . r o t . yaw ) ;
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This assertion fails and the assert-to-pre DTac is applied, which moves this
assertion to a precondition:
method s e l e c t e d t h r u s t e r s . . . r e q u i r e s comb 6= n u l l ; . . .
Now this condition does not hold in the call to selected thrusters by the control
method, raising the “a precondition for this call might not hold” error. By ap-
plying the pre-to-assert DTac, control is updated as follows:
var cmds := i n t e g r a t e d cmd s ( gr ip cmd , aah cmd , a c t i v e a x i s , ignore HCM ) ;
a s s e r t cmds 6= n u l l ; t h r u s t e r s := s e l e c t e d t h r u s t e r s ( cmds ) ;
This assertion fails to verify. We then apply assert-to-post which moves this
assertion to the postcondition of integrated cmds:
method i n t e g r a t e d cmd s . . . r e t u r n s ( comb : SD CMD) ensu re s comb 6= n u l l ;
This completes the proof, and all such errors follow a similar approach. The
only difference is that in certain cases, the final postcondition cannot be veri-
fied. In those cases the post-to-assert DTac, which creates an assertion with the
postcondition at the end of the branch, is applied. This assertion is then moved
upwards by assert-up, and eventually becomes a precondition that is not met by
the caller. This is resolved by the pre-to-assert DTac. At this point the above
approach is followed. In total null-to-assert is applied 10 times; assert-to-pre
11 times; pre-to-assert 5 times; assert-to-post 10 times; assert-up 19 times; and
post-to-assert 4 times.
Verifying the four thruster property After handling all the “null errors”,
the only open goal is the main property: the | thrusters | ≤4 postcondition of
control . The main logic for this computation is within the selected thrusters
method so the first step is to move the goal there: post-to-assert moves it to
an assertion in control , and then assert-to-post moves it to a postcondition
of selected thrusters . post-to-assert then moves the goal into the code, while
assert-up (several) times, reduces this to 4 goals, one for each branch.
First, the last branch is addressed. Here, assert-up moves the assertion “over”
the assignment, replacing thrusters with the assignment expression, resulting in:
a s s e r t | b f ma in + l r ud ma i n | ≤ 4 ; t h r u s t e r s := b f ma in + l r ud ma i n ;
assert-up is then applied until the assertion is just below the call to BF. The
following rewrite rules will be required in the remainder:
| ?x + ?y | ≤ ?n −→ | ?x | ≤ (?n / 2) ∧ | ?y | ≤ (?n / 2) (1)
| ?x + ?y | ≤ ?n −→ | ?x | ≤ ?n ∧ | ?y | = 0 (2)
| ?x + ?y | ≤ ?n −→ | ?x | = 0 ∧ | ?y | ≤ ?n (3)
We first apply assert-rewr((1)) followed by assert-conj-I, resulting in:
a s s e r t | l r u d ma i n | ≤ 4/2 ; a s s e r t | b f ma in | ≤ 4/2 ;
This is followed by assert-to-post, and then move-up followed by assert-to-post,
which moves these into a postcondition |man| ≤4/2 for both LRUD and BF,
completing the first goal.
Next, we address the property at the first branch, by applying assert-up:
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a s s e r t | b f o p t + bf ma in + l r u d o p t + l r ud ma i n | ≤ 4 ;
t h r u s t e r s := b f o p t + bf ma in + l r u d o p t + l r ud ma i n ;
Then assert-up-ctxt twice, creates this assertion just after the call to LRUD:
a s s e r t comb . t r an .X = ZERO ∧ comb . r o t . p i t c h = ZERO ∧ comb . r o t . yaw = ZERO
=⇒ | b f o p t + bf ma in + l r u d o p t + l r ud ma i n | ≤ 4 ;
A combination of assert-rewr((1)), assert-rewr((2)), assert-rewr((3)) and assert-
conj-I results in the following four assertions (with the same hypothesis as
above): | bf opt | =0; |bf main| =0; | lrud opt | ≤4/2; and | lrud main | ≤4/2.
| lrud main | ≤4/2 is already handled by the postcondition of LRUD introduced
by the first goal. Of the remaining, the first two goals are verified by move-up fol-
lowed by assert-to-post for BF, while the third one is verified by assert-to-post for
LRUD, after assert-strengthen has been applied trice to remove the conditions.
The same approach is applied to the third goal, where the condition is
comb.tran.X =ZERO ∧ ¬(comb.rot.pitch =ZERO ∧ comb.rot.yaw =ZERO), and
conditional assertions have the conclusions | bf opt | =0, |bf main| ≤2 and
| lrud main | ≤2. Only the first of these is not provable, which becomes a post-
condition for BF by move-up followed by assert-to-post.
We follow the same approach for the final goal, which has the condition
comb.tran.X 6= ZERO ∧ comb.rot.pitch =ZERO ∧ comb.rot.yaw =ZERO, and
the three goals | lrud opt | =0, |bf main| ≤2 and | lrud main | ≤2. In this case,
only the first goal is not proven. This property relies on the fact that there will
only be one transition command at a time, thus, since X is not ZERO, that means
that Y and Z are. We thus add the following precondition to selected thrusters
r e q u i r e s comb . t r an .X 6= ZERO =⇒ comb . t r an .Y = ZERO ∧ comb . t r an . Z = ZERO;
by the pre-I DTac. As a result of this, the precondition to the selected thrusters
call in control is violated. We then apply the pre-to-assert DTac, which adds
the assertion before the call, followed by the assert-to-post that adds this as a
postcondition to integrated commands. This is then proven by a combination of
post-to-assert and assert-to-post DTacs to auxiliary methods (not given here).
The newly added precondition is moved into an assertion by pre-to-assert.
Then, several assert-down DTacs are applied so that it is moved just before the
failing | lrud opt | =0 assertion:
a s s e r t comb . t r an .X 6= ZERO =⇒ comb . t r an .Y = ZERO ∧ comb . t r an . Z = ZERO;
a s s e r t comb . t r an .X 6= ZERO . . . =⇒ | l r u d o p t | = 0
The assert-comb1 DTac combines these into
a s s e r t comb . t r an .Y = ZERO ∧ comb . t r an . Z = ZERO . . . =⇒ | l r u d o p t | = 0
assert-strengthen (twice) removes pitch and yaw from the precondition (as these
are not used by LRUD):
a s s e r t comb . t r an .Y = ZERO ∧ comb . t r an . Z = ZERO =⇒ | l r u d o p t | = 0 ;
We then apply the assert-to-post for LRUD, which completes the proof. In total,
57 DTac applications were required for the “four thruster property”.
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5 Conclusion, Related & Future Work
By developing DTacs and showing a detailed account of their usage to a relevant
case study the hypothesis – ‘it is possible to automate proofs by a notion of
“tactics” for program verifiers as a form of refactoring’ – has been validated.
However, understanding the degree of automation will require further examples,
particularly those with iteration, and importantly, implementation. As Dafny is
open source, the implementation of DTacs can exploit this existing code base, and
represent DTacs as transformations on the abstract syntax tree. Such evaluation
is likely to generalise, and hopefully improve, the DTacs derived here, giving
some indication of how to prune the search. The implementation of SAFER
in Dafny was based upon previous embeddings in PVS [19] and VDM-SL [1].
SAFER has here been used as a proof of concept for the feasibility of DTacs,
whilst [19,1] uses existing tools and approaches. A direct comparison between
the approaches would therefore be unfair at this point.
DTacs are inspired by tactics for ITP systems, originating from the LCF
system [11]. Most tactic languages are still based on this paradigm. To a less
formal extent, refactoring also follows a “trusted kernel” idea, where each refac-
toring should just make a small change to the code as this is easier to analyse
[10]. Larger refactorings then become compositions of smaller ones. DTacs adopt
the same approach, as most DTacs only make small changes, and the majority
are special cases and/or compositions of smaller DTacs. Composition and spe-
cialisation are supported by sequential and branching combinators, and the use
of arguments and partial instantiations. Other common combinators, such as
“orelse”, “try” and “repeat” are likely to be added in the future.
The proofs conducted in the case-study and the LemmaLength example are
rather low-level and tedious at times. This is a consequence of working at the
lowest “kernel” level. Future work would include the development of higher level
strategies which combine low-level rules. Two examples illustrating that this
should be possible have been seen: (1) the “null reference” errors all followed
the same strategy; and (2) three out of four of the “four thruster” goals followed
the same overall strategy. Moreover, the last goal only deviated by requiring an
additional precondition.
Chen [6] describes a simple Dijkstra’s guarded-command style imperative
programming language, including both “normal” execution statements as well
as special verification statements. The verification statements can then be used
to implement e.g. type checkers, abstract interpreters or contracts for the exe-
cution statements. This approach is much more general than DTacs, and whilst
verification statements may be used to implement a similar notion of tactics,
this is not discussed in [6]. Moreover, it is not clear how such approach will work
with an existing programming language and program verifier.
In [20], refactoring of proof scripts (for ITP systems) is addressed. Whilst it
has similarities to DTacs in the sense that both target proofs, it deviates as it is
used to improve existing proofs – albeit, it could be applied to generalise proofs
into more general tactics. Further, DTacs deviate from the case-based reasoning
used in [17] where specifications are carried between programs. DTacs provides a
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mechanism for encoding generic strategies, which could be used to prove both the
source and target programs in such a setting. A different approach to refactoring,
is to “optimise” the compilation into the IVL, as was done with the ‘induction
tactic’ for Dafny [15]. It is important to note the difference between DTacs and
the vast number of static analysers such as abstract interpretation [8]. There,
the goal is to discover properties of programs, which could be utilised to prove
properties. DTacs provide a way to enable users to encode their strategies when
the proof is beyond such methods. However, in the future it would be interesting
to see how such work could be utilised in a DTac. Finally, cases of the assert-up
DTac bear resemblance to a predicate transformer [9] – it should therefore be
possible to encode other predicate transformers as DTacs in the same way.
This paper demonstrates that the use of “tactics” for program verifiers is
feasible and provides a firm foundation for further research in this area.
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